Recovery of consciousness following severe brain injuries can occur over long time intervals. Importantly, evolving cognitive recovery can be strongly dissociated from motor recovery in some individuals, resulting in underestimation of cognitive capacities. Common mechanisms of cerebral dysfunction that arise at the neuronal population level may explain slow functional recoveries from severe brain injuries. This review proposes a ''mesocircuit'' model that predicts specific roles for different structural and dynamic changes that may occur gradually during recovery. Recent functional neuroimaging studies that operationally identify varying levels of awareness, memory and other higher brain functions in patients with no behavioral evidence of these cognitive capacities are discussed. Measuring evolving changes in underlying brain function and dynamics post-injury and post-treatment frames future investigative work.
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Recovery of conscious awareness and cognitive function following severe brain injuries can occur over surprisingly long time intervals of months, years and rarely decades [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Moreover, recovery of consciousness can significantly lag or be entirely dissociated from expressed motor behavior [6] . It is increasingly recognized that very limited evidence of behavioral responsiveness at the bedside (or rarely, even a lack of any evidence) does not accurately predict underlying brain function. As a result, significant ambiguity can be present when encountering behavioral features consistent with clinical diagnoses ranging from vegetative state (no behavioral evidence of self-or environmental awareness), minimally conscious state (at least some behavioral evidence of awareness) and up to and including patients in locked-in state (full consciousness with limited to no motor control). Importantly, bedside behavioral assessment cannot alone provide insight into likelihood of further recovery, avenues for specific intervention or level of consciousness and cognitive capacity. The underlying mechanisms accounting for this wide variance in recovery patterns are unknown and provide a compelling scientific challenge for further understanding.
This review considers aspects of current research aimed at understanding recovery of consciousness after brain injury. To best organize this advancing knowledge, a model at the neuronal population level is proposed that accounts for observed neuroimaging findings and response to treatments in the context of pathophysiological mechanisms associated with severe brain injury. This 'mesocircuit' model provides a parsimonious explanation of observations of recovery of consciousness after severe brain injuries and predicts several seemingly unrelated findings. From this vantage point recent research advances are reviewed including 1) interventional studies using pharmacological and electrical stimulation methods to improve function in patients with longstanding disorder of consciousness; 2) new functional neuroimaging techniques that reliably, and operationally, identify levels of awareness, memory and other higher brain functions in patients who show no behavioral evidence of these capacities; and 3) structural neuroimaging studies that identify changes in brain structure that might play a key role in the recovery process.
A short primer on severe brain injuries Disorders of consciousness Figure 1 organizes relationships among several clinical syndromes often lumped into the category of 'disorders of consciousness'. Coma and vegetative state (VS) are both considered unconscious brain states as determined by the bedside behavioral exam. In both syndromes, patients are entirely unresponsive to environmental stimuli and fail to initiate goal-directed behaviors. Comatose patients show no state variation and usually have closed eyes and no response to the most vigorous stimulation. In VS, patients have a cycling of irregular periods of eye opening and eye closure which does not correlate with identifiable electroencephalographic (EEG) features of either sleep or normal wakefulness [7] . In the minimally conscious state (MCS) [8] patients demonstrate unequivocal but inconsistent evidence of awareness of self or the environment through a wide variety of behavioral response patterns that can be demonstrated at the bedside [9] . The functional boundary indicating emergence from MCS is the demonstration of reliable verbal or gestural communication.
Some fully conscious patients display a behavioral profile completely consistent with deep coma: eyes closed and unresponsive to any external stimuli as determined by a bedside examination. This condition is defined as the locked-in state (LIS; far right bottom panel of Figure 1 ). LIS is not a disorder of consciousness; by definition, LIS patients retain total preservation of cognitive function. LIS typically arises from neurological injuries that selectively disrupt the motor pathways or slowly reduce motor neuron function raising the probability of this diagnosis. The complexity of many brain injuries, however, creates a highly problematic set of patients who are unable to produce consistent goal-directed movements that allow for communication. Such individuals can retain significant 
